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Abstract: In multi-criteria decision analysis workshops, participants often appraise the options individually before dis-
cussing the scoring as a group. The individual appraisals lead to score ranges within which the group then seeks the 
necessary agreement to identify their preferred option. Preference programming enables some options to be identified as 
dominated even before the group agrees on a precise scoring for them. 
Workshop participants usually face time pressure to make a decision. Decision support can be provided by flagging op-
tions for which further agreement on their scores seems particularly valuable. By valuable, we mean the opportunity to 
identify other options as dominated (using preference programming) without having their precise scores agreed before-
hand. The present paper quantifies this Value of Agreement and extends the concept to portfolio decision analysis and 
criterion weights. The new concept is validated through a case study in recruitment. 
Keywords: Multi-criteria decision analysis, incomplete information, group decision support system, preference program-
ming, portfolio decision analysis, human resources 
 
1 Introduction  
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) often assesses options with an additive independent value func-
tion (Keeney & Raiffa 1976). The performance of each option 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 is valued on each criterion 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
along a 0–100 scale to obtain the value scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗 (see Table 1 for symbols). While the value score for 
tangible criteria can often be derived from well-defined, marginal value functions, which map attribute 
levels to value scores (e.g. frequency of a service, horsepower of a machine, traffic noise), many intan-
gible criteria require highly subjective judgements to assign value scores to options (e.g. impact of con-
structions on scenery, level of expertise of organisation, comfort of vehicle) (Keeney 1982). The criteria 
are weighted against each other, leading to the relative importance judgements 𝑤𝑗 with ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 1. The 
decision model recommends the option with the greatest score 𝑉𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑗 . 
Real-world problems are rarely that simplistic, and extensions to the model are therefore required. The 
present paper addresses MCDA problems in which the score preferences are initially incomplete; i.e. 
the criterion scores can take any number in the range [𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗]. The options’ value scores hence span 
from 𝑉𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑗  to ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑗 . If there is one option that dominates all others, it is called the robust 
option (Roy 1998). 
Such incomplete preference information (Hazen 1986, Kirkwood & Sarin 1985, Sarin 1977) is often en-
countered by decision-making groups appraising options against intangible selection criteria. In multi-
criteria group decision making, participants frequently appraise the options individually before seeking 
agreement on the scores. The individual precise criterion scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 by participants 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 lead to crite-
rion score ranges from 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = min
𝑘
{𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘} to ?̅?𝑖𝑗 = max
𝑘
{𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘}, within which the group looks for the neces-
sary agreement to identify the group’s robust option. ‘Aggregation’ and ‘consensus’ are the two principle 
methods to reach this necessary agreement. Using the aggregation method, an influence weight is as-
signed to each participant (e.g. Dias & Sarabando 2012, Kim & Ahn 1999, Salo 1995). A precise group 
score for all decision options can be automatically calculated by weighting the individual scores, which 
immediately clarifies the group’s preferred option according to the participants’ influence. Using the 
consensus method, the group engages in a discussion from which the necessary consensus on the 
scores needs to emerge with mutual agreement (e.g. Dias & Climaco 2005, Matsatsinis & Samaras 
2001, Mustajoki et al. 2007, Phillips 2011, Shakhsi-Niaei et al. 2011, Vilkkumaa et al. 2014). The ag-
gregation method stresses the positional power of each decision maker, while the consensus method 
emphasises mutual learning from each other’s insights in the decision problem. When using the con-
sensus method, time pressure may make it challenging for the group to come to a full agreement on all 
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scores (Kim & Ahn 1997, Weber 1987). In this paper, 
we develop a new concept, which helps the consensus 
method in multi-criteria group decision-making to be 
more time-effective.  
When thoroughly reviewing the individual appraisals 
𝑉𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑗  and the resulting score ranges from 𝑉𝑖 =
min
𝑘
{𝑉𝑖𝑘} to ?̅?𝑖 = max
𝑘
{𝑉𝑖𝑘}, a skilled facilitator might be 
able to roughly guess which options are definitely domi-
nated, which options are likely to be dominated after 
further agreement on some other options is sought, 
which ones have a totally unclear fate and which ones 
have a good chance of becoming the robust one. The 
present paper attempts to replace this intuitive guessing 
with a quantitative concept we call Value of Agreement. 
Options with a high Value of Agreement are more at-
tractive to a group discussion as knowing their agreed 
value score may allow eliminating other options as dom-
inated without the need to seek agreement on their 
scores beforehand; thus, finding the robust option will 
require less effort. Altogether, the Value of Agreement 
estimates the impact of eliciting additional preference 
information on the time requirements of a decision anal-
ysis workshop.  
Designing workshops to eliminate options quickly has 
hitherto been addressed only by very few publications. 
Hämäläinen & Pöyhönen (1996) and Salo & 
Hämäläinen (1995) analysed problems where only the 
weight information was incomplete. They suggested that 
the group should first seek agreement on the criteria 
with large weight ranges. Mustajoki & Hämäläinen 
(2005) and Mustajoki et al. (2007) provided decision aid 
to wisely choose the next swap in the MCDA method 
even swaps. Mustajoki et al. (2005) studied which crite-
rion should be used as the reference criterion for the 
weight elicitation to harness preference programming 
effectively. Liesiö et al. (2007, 2008) briefly examined the problem for portfolio decision analysis but 
only offered limited guidance for an option elicitation order.1 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses normative preference programming tech-
niques to identify definitely dominated options. Section 3 explains descriptive approaches developed by 
psychologists to predict on which precise scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  the group may finally agree. Section 4 pulls togeth-
er the normative and descriptive decision-making perspectives from the previous two sections and de-
velops a prescriptive measure for the Value of Agreement on option scores in MCDA. Section 5 modi-
fies this measure for multi-criteria portfolio decision analysis (PDA)—an important extension of MCDA. 
Section 6 adapts the Value of Agreement to weights. Section 7 demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
proposed measures with a computer simulation. Section 8 reports on the application of the Value of 
Agreement concept to a PDA-based recruitment selection problem using computer software. Section 9 
concludes with a research outlook. 
2 Preference programming 
Preference programming encompasses a set of techniques to eliminate definitely dominated options 
and ultimately identify the robust option given the incomplete information about scores and weights 
(Arbel 1989, Punkka & Salo 2013, Salo & Hämäläinen 1992, 2010). The expressed incomplete prefer-
ences are typically range-based or ordinal-based (e.g. Kirkwood & Sarin 1985, Liesiö et al. 2007, 
Punkka & Salo 2013). Preference programming is a normative approach that, in its original form, cap-
tures the incomplete information in a set of linear constraints. Non-dominated options can be easily 
identified by examining the extreme points of the resulting convex hull (e.g. Hazen 1986, Liesiö et al. 
Table 1 
Symbols. 
 
𝐵 Budget 
𝑐𝑖 Cost of option 𝑖 
𝜀 Tolerance value 
𝑖/𝐼 Index/set of options 
𝑖∗ Robust option 
𝑗/𝐽 Index/set of criteria 
𝑘/𝐾 Index/set of assessors (workshop partici-
pants) 
𝜃 Parameter for social judgement scheme 
𝜑/?̂? Value score of the robust option in the 
MCDA case; borderline value-for-money 
ratio in the PDA case; ?̂? is the heuristic 
choice for 𝜑 
𝑟𝑖/𝑟𝑖
∗  Value-for-money ratio of option 𝑖; 𝑟𝑖
∗ is 
the prediction for 𝑟𝑖 
𝑆𝑤 Set of extreme points of the convex hull 
of feasible weight combinations 
𝑣𝑖𝑗/𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ /𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎 /𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 Value score of option 𝑖 for criterion 𝑗; 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ , 
𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  and 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 are, respectively, the predict-
ed, the actually agreed and the proposed 
value for 𝑣𝑖𝑗 
𝑣𝑖𝑗/?̅?𝑖𝑗  Lower/upper bound for 𝑣𝑖𝑗 
𝑣𝑖′𝑗
#𝑖 /?̅?𝑖′𝑗
#𝑖  Lower/upper bound for 𝑣𝑖′𝑗 after assum-
ing that 𝑣𝑖𝑗 takes its predicted value 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 Value for 𝑣𝑖𝑗 assigned by assessor 𝑘 
𝑉𝑖/𝑉𝑖
∗/𝑉𝑖
𝑎 Overall value score of option 𝑖; 𝑉𝑖
∗ and 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 
are, respectively, the predicted and the 
actually agreed value for 𝑉𝑖 
𝑉𝑖/?̅?𝑖 Lower/upper bound for 𝑉𝑖 
𝑉𝑖′
#𝑖/?̅?𝑖′
#𝑖 Lower/upper bound for 𝑉𝑖′ after assuming 
that 𝑉𝑖 takes its predicted value 𝑉𝑖
∗ 
𝑉𝑖
#𝑗/?̅?𝑖
#𝑗
 Lower/upper bound for 𝑉𝑖 after assuming 
that 𝑤𝑗 takes its predicted value 𝑤𝑗
∗ 
𝑉𝑖𝑘 Value for 𝑉𝑖 assigned by assessor 𝑘 
𝑤𝑗/𝑤𝑗
∗/𝑤𝑗
𝑎 0–1 normalised weight of criterion 𝑗; 𝑤𝑗
∗ 
and 𝑤𝑗
𝑎 are, respectively, the predicted 
and the actually agreed value for 𝑤𝑗. A 
tilde ~ on top indicates that the weight is 
not normalised. 
𝑤𝑗𝑘 0–1 normalised value for 𝑤𝑗 assigned by 
assessor 𝑘. A tilde ~ on top indicates 
that the weight is not normalised. 
𝑤𝑗/?̅?𝑗  0–1 normalised lower/upper bound for 
𝑤𝑗. A tilde ~ on top indicates that the 
weight is not normalised. 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 Centrality position of group member 𝑘 for 
the assessment of score 𝑣𝑖𝑗 according to 
the social judgement scheme 
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2007, White et al. 1984) or by solving 
mathematical programmes (e.g. Arbel & 
Vargas 1993, Lahdelma et al. 1998, 
Salo & Hämäläinen 1995). 
The range-based strict dominance rule 
(e.g. Hazen 1986) 
𝑖1 ≻ 𝑖2 ⇔ 𝑉𝑖1 ≥ ?̅?𝑖2   and  ?̅?𝑖1 > ?̅?𝑖2 
is a logic based on preference ranges 
which can be applied in a basic MCDA problem where just the score information is incomplete. For the 
robust option 𝑖∗, the strict preference 𝑖∗ ≻ 𝑖 must hold for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼\{𝑖∗}.2  
An ordinal-based weak dominance rule can be constructed by considering participants’ implicit rankings 
when assigning scores to options. Option 𝑖1 weakly dominates option 𝑖2 on criterion 𝑗 if all participants 𝑘 
believe that 𝑣𝑖1𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑣𝑖2𝑗𝑘. In this case, the linear constraint 𝑣𝑖1𝑗 ≥ 𝑣𝑖2𝑗 can be added to the preference 
programme. Option 𝑖1 weakly dominates options 𝑖2 overall if all participants 𝑘 believe that 𝑉𝑖1𝑘 =
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖1𝑗𝑘𝑗 ≥ ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖2𝑗𝑘𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖2𝑘. In this case, the linear constraint ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖1 𝑗𝑗 ≥ ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖2 𝑗𝑗  can be added to 
the preference programme. Moreover, assume there is already a group agreement that 𝑣𝑖1𝑗 ≥ 𝑣𝑖2𝑗. In 
this condition, learning that the group agreed on the precise number 𝑣𝑖1𝑗
𝑎  (𝑣𝑖2𝑗
𝑎 ) for the score 𝑣𝑖1𝑗 (𝑣𝑖2𝑗) 
may allow for tightening the upper (lower) bound such that ?̅?𝑖2𝑗 ≔ min{𝑣𝑖1𝑗
𝑎 , ?̅?𝑖2𝑗} (𝑣𝑖1𝑗 ≔ max{𝑣𝑖1𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖2𝑗
𝑎 }). 
The same tightening rule can be used for option scores. If there is a group consensus on 𝑉𝑖1 ≥ 𝑉𝑖2 and 
the participants agree on the precise option score 𝑉𝑖1
𝑎 (𝑉𝑖2
𝑎), the upper (lower) bound for 𝑉𝑖2 (𝑉𝑖1) can be 
updated to ?̅?𝑖2𝑗 ≔ min{𝑉𝑖1𝑗
𝑎 , ?̅?𝑖2} (𝑉𝑖1 ≔ max{𝑉𝑖1 , 𝑉𝑖2
𝑎}). 
3 Predicting agreement 
The group’s actual agreement on a precise number 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  for a score 𝑣𝑖𝑗 can be predicted when all group 
members have already made their individual appraisals 𝑣𝑘𝑖𝑗. Next, we distinguish between the case in 
which the participants only know the single appraisals 𝑣𝑘𝑖𝑗 or their ranges [𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗] (section 3.1) and the 
case in which an aggregate of their appraisals such as the mean or the median is presented to the par-
ticipants (section 3.2). 
3.1 Social judgement scheme 
The social decision scheme (Davis 1973) has led to much insight into how small groups arrive from in-
dividual preference statements to a group decision along a discrete scale of measurement (Parks & 
Kerr 1999). A major finding of this research stream is that individuals whose preferences are quite simi-
lar to those of other group members wield an exponentially greater influence on the final decision than 
those individuals with extreme preferences. Davis (1996) manifests this observation in the equations of 
his social judgement scheme (SJS)—a continuous generalisation of the discrete social decision 
scheme.  
𝑧𝑘𝑖𝑗 denotes the SJS centrality position of group member 𝑘 for the assessment of score 𝑣𝑖𝑗 and is de-
fined as 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 =
∑ 𝑒−𝜃|𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘−𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑙|
|𝐾|
𝑙=1,𝑘≠𝑙
∑ ∑ 𝑒−𝜃|𝑣𝑖𝑗ℎ−𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑙|
|𝐾|
𝑙=1,ℎ≠𝑙
|𝐾|
ℎ=1
  , 𝜃 = 1. 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 can be interpreted as the percentage of influence of assessor 𝑘 on the group’s collective choice for 
𝑣𝑖𝑗. 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ = ∑𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the most central value for 𝑣𝑖𝑗 according to SJS, and thus a good point estimator of 
the group’s unknown actual agreement 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎 . Fig. 1 exhibits an example where the point estimator 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  is 
derived from individual appraisals using three common aggregates and SJS. 
Wide research on the social decision scheme provides a solid theoretical foundation for the centrality 
position approach. Furthermore, experiments by Bonner et al. (2004), Davis et al. (1997), Nadler et al. 
(2001) and Ohtsubo et al. (2002) offer good evidence in favour of SJS. Applications of SJS in decision 
support systems for MCDA workshops can be found in the studies conducted by Rigopoulos (2008), 
Tsiporkova & Boeva (2006) and Tundjungsari et al. (2012). It is important to also highlight that SJS 
shares the property of heavily discounting extreme opinions with the geometric mean as the consensus 
estimator. While there are many case studies that use the geometric mean in group decision problems 
modelled as Analytical Hierarchy Process (e.g. Saaty & Vargas 2001, Vaidya & Kumar 2006), we are 
not aware of any research that validates the geometric mean as an appropriate consensus estimator. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of |𝐾| = 8 individual appraisals 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 with corresponding SJS 
centrality positions 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 and predicted agreement 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗  according to the geo-
metric mean, the arithmetic mean, the median and SJS. 
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It needs to be mentioned that the strength of SJS is in majori-
ty/plurality situations where no group member can plausibly 
demonstrate why their judgement must be the correct one. 
Given that preference statements are rather subjective (e.g. 
Keeney 1992, Payne et al. 1993, Slovic & Lichtenstein 2006), 
this assumption is normally fulfilled for the MCDA problem. In 
situations where members with extreme opinions can (i) plau-
sibly demonstrate the correctness of their positions, (ii) have 
hierarchal power or (iii) are recognised as the group’s experts, 
the centrality concept of SJS is not the right approach 
(Bonner et al. 2007, see also: Laughlin 1980, Laughlin & Ellis 1986). 
3.2 Proposed agreement 
In some consensus-based MCDA workshops, the group is presented with a proposed aggregate 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 of 
the individual appraisals 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 to support and expedite its quest for a consensus. For instance, the 
mean/median is often seen as a good estimator of the unknown ‘optimal’ value (called 'wisdom of 
crowds' by Surowiecki 2005, see also: Ariely et al. 2000, Sunstein 2005), from which the group should 
only diverge with good reasons. It is also possible to have more sophisticated proposed aggregates 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 
that consider fairness concerns among group members or uneven influence of participants on the col-
lective decision based on positional power or expertise (e.g. Keeney 2013, van den Honert 2001).  
Viewing the proposed aggregate prompts an anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1974) and it 
becomes likely that the group finally agrees on this presented value. For example, we observed in a 
recent decision analysis workshop at the National Audit Office in Britain that the participants chose the 
median shown to them beforehand for 31 out of 35 options. Hence, the predicted agreement 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  should 
take the value of the proposed aggregate 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 in such situations. 
4 Measures for the Value of Agreement in MCDA 
Our proposed measure for the Value of Agreement rests on the assumption that one can make reason-
ably precise predictions 𝑉𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗
𝑗  on what scores the group will agree on for options 𝑖, as outlined in 
the previous section. The score ranges [𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖] and the predicted agreements 𝑉𝑖
∗ can be graphically pre-
sented in a value score chart. It will be shown that such a chart helps define two types of measures, 
denoted 𝑔𝐴 and 𝑔𝐵 henceforth, indicating the likelihood of eliminating dominated options without reach-
ing prior full agreement on them. Bringing the two measures together in a lexicographical fashion leads 
to a recommendation on which options the group should next seek agreement. 
In a value score chart (see Fig. 2), the options are displayed in the form of horizontal lines along a scale 
of 0–100. The horizontal lines represent the option score ranges [𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖] and the dots on them show the 
predicted agreements 𝑉𝑖
∗. The borderline between the red area (appears in darker grey on black-and-
white prints) and the green area (appears in light grey) marks the potentially still unknown agreed pre-
cise value score 𝜑 for the still unknown robust option. ?̂? = max
𝑖
{𝑉𝑖
∗} is a heuristic choice for 𝜑. 𝑉𝑖
∗ is al-
ways replaced by 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎
𝑗  if the group has already elicited full agreement on option 𝑖. Note that 
the heuristic choice ?̂? underestimates 𝜑 systematically, as the expected value of the maximum of a set 
of random variables is larger than the maximum of the expected values of the same set of random vari-
ables (Chung 1948). There is a research opportunity to explore distribution functions for the agreement 
rather than just settling for a point estimator 𝑉𝑖
∗. Such work would be interesting in itself and could also 
lead to unbiased heuristic choices for 𝜑. 
For those options 𝑖, whose bars are partially in the value score chart’s green area, i.e. 𝜑 ∈ (𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖), it is 
not at all certain whether one can identify them as dominated without further agreement on their value 
scores. To quickly eliminate dominated options, options 𝑖 whose hypothetical agreements 𝑉𝑖
∗ would not 
only shift themselves, but also other options outside the green area (or on its edge3) due to ordinal-
based weak dominance relations would therefore be particularly attractive to a group discussion. Let 
[𝑉𝑖′
#𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖′
#𝑖] be the overall score range of option 𝑖′ ∈ 𝐼 after having learnt that option 𝑖 takes the predicted 
value score 𝑉𝑖
∗, then the count 
𝑔𝐴(𝑖) = |𝐼| − | {𝑖
′ ∈ 𝐼: 𝜑 ∈ (𝑉𝑖′
#𝑖, ?̅?𝑖′
#𝑖)} | 
is a simple measure for the Value of Agreement for option 𝑖. 𝜑 takes the value of the heuristic choice ?̂? 
in our computer simulation in section 7.3. Assume, for instance, that the participants collectively agree 
 
Fig. 2. Value score chart – bars represent fea-
sible score interval for each option.  
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Fig. 3. Value-for-money chart: bars represent 
feasible value-for-money ratio for each option. 
 
Fig. 4. Options ordered by decreasing predicted 
value-for-money ratio 𝑟𝑖
∗. 
 
that option 4 is better than option 2 on a particular criterion 𝑗 in 
Fig. 2. Knowing the actually agreed criterion score 𝑣4𝑗
𝑎  for op-
tion 4 may allow pushing the upper bound of option 2 leftwards 
when using the tightening rule from section 2, such that ?̅?2
#4 ≤
𝜑. This, in turn would make it much more likely to rule out that 
option 2 requires further agreement for it to be identified as 
dominated. In this example, 𝑔𝐴(4) = 1.
4  
In many cases, the agreement on ordinal preference relations 
is not sufficient to allow shifting a further option besides 𝑖 off 
the green area after learning that 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖
∗. A tie-breaker thus is 
needed: if the upper bound of option 𝑖 is to the far right from 
the borderline 𝜑, i.e.  
𝑔𝐵(𝑖) = ?̅?𝑖 − 𝜑  
is large, it is less likely that the group can avoid some further 
agreement on its score. Thus, it would be wise to discuss those 
options with large 𝑔𝐵 first. For the example in Fig. 2, 𝑔𝐵 rec-
ommends choosing option 1 next. 
Pulling the two measures 𝑔𝐴 and 𝑔𝐵 together leads to the lexi-
cographic rule  
argmax
𝑖∈𝐼
𝑔𝐴(𝑖) ≫ argmax
𝑖∈𝐼
𝑔𝐵(𝑖) 
for selecting the next option for group discussion. In words: 
choose the option 𝑖 that maximises 𝑔𝐴(𝑖) and if more than one 
possible option 𝑖 exists, then select among those the option 
that maximises 𝑔𝐵(𝑖).  
5 Measures for the Value of Agreement in PDA 
Portfolio decision analysis (PDA) extends MCDA by allowing the selection of more than one option 
(Phillips & Bana e Costa 2007, Salo et al. 2011). In the basic form of the PDA problem, fixed costs 𝑐𝑖 
are attached to each option (typically called ‘project’ in PDA), options can be chosen independently of 
each other, and the total number of options is limited by a budget 𝐵. A robust portfolio 𝑝∗ has at least an 
as high an overall score of ∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑖∈𝑝∗  (and for one precise score allocation, a higher overall score) as that 
of any other feasible portfolio 𝑝 independently of which scores the group agrees on within the remaining 
ranges [𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖]. The PDA is a special knapsack optimisation problem (Martello & Toth 1990), in which 
the majority of cases favour options with a high value-for-money ratio 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖/𝑐𝑖 (Phillips & Bana e Costa 
2007). The preference programme from Liesiö et al. (2007) is currently the only available knapsack op-
timisation approach for incomplete score information that allows the identification of options which are 
definitely or definitely not in the robust portfolio. The remainder of this section will derive a measure for 
the Value of Agreement analogously to the MCDA case.  
In a value-for-money chart (see Fig. 3), the options are displayed in the form of horizontal ratio bars 
representing the feasible ratios 𝑟𝑖 ∈ [𝑉𝑖/𝑐𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖/𝑐𝑖]. When ordering the options by their value-for-money 
ratios, one can calculate the borderline value-for-money ratio 𝜑, defined as the mean of the value-for-
money ratio of the last option that still fits completely and the first option that fits only partially in the 
portfolio (see Fig. 4). A heuristic choice ?̂? for the borderline ratio 𝜑 can be computed by using the pre-
dicted value-for money-ratios 𝑟𝑖
∗ = 𝑉𝑖
∗/𝑐𝑖. 𝜑 is the border between the red and green areas in the value-
for-money chart. 
For options 𝑖 crossing the borderline ratio, i.e. 𝜑 ∈ [𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖], it is quite unclear whether they will be in the 
robust portfolio. Again, options whose predicted agreement 𝑉𝑖
∗ would not only shift themselves, but also 
other options away from the borderline due to ordinal preference relations should be considered first for 
the group discussion. Let [𝑉𝑖′
#𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖′
#𝑖] be the updated overall score range of option 𝑖′ ∈ 𝐼 assuming that 𝑖 
takes the predicted option score 𝑉𝑖
∗, then 
𝑔𝐴(𝑖) = |𝐼| − | {𝑖
′ ∈ 𝐼: 𝜑 ∈ [
𝑉
𝑖′
#𝑖
𝑐𝑖′
,
𝑉
𝑖′
#𝑖
𝑐𝑖′
]} |  
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provides a first measure for the Value of Agreement for option 𝑖. Assume, for example, that the collec-
tive agreement is that options 5 and 6 are both better than option 8 in Fig. 3. In such a case, knowing 
the agreement on option 8 makes it likely that options 5 and 6 can be ruled out as requiring further 
agreement to identify them as definitely in the robust portfolio. In this example, 𝑔1(8) = 6.  
As a tie-breaker, the distance between the borderline ratio and the nearest end of the option’s ratio bar, 
i.e. 
𝑔𝐵(𝑖) = {
     min{|𝜑 − 𝑟𝑖| , |?̅?𝑖 − 𝜑|}    ,  𝜑 ∈ [𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖] 
− min{|𝜑 − 𝑟𝑖| , |?̅?𝑖 − 𝜑|}    ,  𝜑 ∉ [𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖]
 , 
is used. If 𝑖’s ratio bar does not intersect the borderline ratio, 𝑔𝐵(𝑖) obtains a negative value. The larger 
the 𝑔𝐵 of an option, the less likely it is that the group can avoid some further agreement on the option’s 
score. In Fig. 3, the 𝑔𝐵 measure recommends option 1 next. 
The next option to be discussed by the group is again chosen using the lexicographic rule 
argmax
𝑖∈𝐼
𝑔𝐴(𝑖) ≫ argmax
𝑖∈𝐼
𝑔𝐵(𝑖) . 
It should be noted that the two measures for the Value of Agreement described in this paper work only 
for the basic PDA problem. Model extensions, such as incomplete cost information, options that cannot 
be independently chosen or an additional constraint on the maximum number of options in the portfolio 
would require different measures for the Value of Agreement. 
6 Extension to weights  
In this section, we adapt the previously developed measures for the Value of Agreement to SWING 
weighting with incomplete weight information. The value score information 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is assumed to be com-
plete in the following calculations and assessors 𝑘 only appraise the weights 𝑤𝑗𝑘 for all criteria 𝑗 individ-
ually. We also assume that the popular SWING weighting method (Edwards & Barron 1994, Mustajoki 
et al. 2005, von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986) is employed and that the decision making group jointly 
agrees on a reference criterion as a first step. A fixed, non-normalised weight (e.g. 100 points) is as-
signed to reference criterion 𝑗𝑟 what establishes a linear scale of measurement. Each participant as-
signs non-normalised individual weights ?̃?𝑗𝑘 to all other criteria 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽\{𝑗
𝑟 }, reflecting their importance 
relative to the reference criterion. The resulting non-normalised weight ranges span from ?̃?𝑗 = min
𝑘
{?̃?𝑗𝑘} 
to ?̃?𝑗 = max
𝑘
{?̃?𝑗𝑘} within which the group seeks actual agreements ?̃?𝑗
𝑎. Since the non-normalised indi-
vidual weights ?̃?𝑗𝑘 and the actual agreements ?̃?𝑗
𝑎 are all based on the same scale of measurement, es-
tablished by the reference criterion 𝑗𝑟, the Value of Agreement for SWING weights can be computed in 
a similar method as for scores. 
The weight ranges [?̃?𝑗 , ?̃?𝑗] form a convex hull of feasible weight combinations. To compute the mini-
mum and maximum overall value score of options, only 𝑆𝑤 as the set of extreme points of this convex 
hull is relevant (Hazen 1986, Liesiö et al. 2007). Without loss of generality, it is assumed in the following 
that the weight combinations {wj}j∈J
 in 𝑆𝑤 are always normalised such that they sum up to 1; i.e. ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗 =
1 ∀{𝑤𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 ∈ 𝑆𝑤. An option’s overall value score lies between 
𝑉𝑖 = min {∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗 
𝑗
: {𝑤𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 ∈ 𝑆𝑤}   and  ?̅?𝑖 = max {∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗 
𝑗
: {𝑤𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 ∈ 𝑆𝑤} . 
In the following, 𝑤𝑗
∗ denotes the predicted weight agreement for criterion 𝑗 derived analogously to sec-
tion 3 and takes the value 𝑤𝑗
𝑎 after a group agreement has been reached. The predicted weights 𝑤𝑗
∗ are 
normalised and sum up to 1. 
Since this paper only aims to introduce the new concept Value of Agreement, applications to other 
weight elicitation methods are not explored further. For instance, applying the Value of Agreement to 
the AHP (Saaty 1990) would require prioritising the elicitation of weight ratio pairs and addressing the 
issue of inconsistencies. For the point assignment method (Nutt 1980), the fact that the actual agreed-
upon weights must add up to a constant sum (e.g. 100 points) and therefore cannot be elicited inde-
pendently from each other poses a challenge to the feasibility of applying the Value of Agreement con-
cept. Finally, if the decision makers choose to structure a larger number of criteria in a value tree 
(Keeney & Raiffa 1976), any Value of Agreement measure would have to take into account the interde-
pendencies of the weights on different hierarchy levels.  
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6.1 Preference programming 
As a range-based strict dominance rule, we use the linear programming approach from Hannan (1981) 
for the MCDA case and the dynamic programming approach from Liesiö et al. (2007)5 for the PDA 
case. The ordinal-based weak dominance rule for weights 𝑤𝑗 is analogous to value scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗 (see sec-
tion 2). 
6.2 MCDA  
The heuristic choice for the borderline 𝜑 is max
𝑖
{∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑗 }. Let [𝑉𝑖
#𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖
#𝑗] be the overall score range of 
option 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 after having learnt that criterion 𝑗 takes the predicted weight 𝑤𝑗
∗ and having applied the ordi-
nal-based weak dominance rule. The first measure for the Value of Agreement, 
𝑔𝐴(𝑗) = |𝐼| − | {𝑖 ∈ 𝐼: 𝜑 ∈ (𝑉𝑖
#𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖
#𝑗)} | , 
counts the number of options whose upper bounds are still larger than the heuristic choice after assum-
ing 𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗
∗. In general, 𝑔𝐴 favours ‘high impact’ criteria 𝑗 with a large normalised weight span 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑤𝑗 
and large variance Var𝑖{𝑣𝑖𝑗} among its criterion scores. Using 
𝑔𝐵(𝑗) = max
𝑖
{?̅?𝑖
#𝑗 − 𝜑}  
as a tie-breaker, the lexicographic rule for selecting the next criterion to be discussed by the group is 
argmax
𝑗∈𝐽
𝑔𝐴(𝑗) ≫ argmax
𝑗∈𝐽
𝑔𝐵(𝑗) . 
6.3 PDA 
The borderline value-for-money ratio 𝜑 is computed as described in section 5 using 𝑉𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑗  as 
the predicted agreement. [𝑉𝑖
#𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖
#𝑗] is the updated overall score range after assuming 𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗
∗. The first 
measure for the Value of Agreement is 
𝑔𝐴(𝑗) = |𝐼| − | {𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∶ 𝜑 ∈ [
𝑉𝑖
#𝑗
𝑐𝑖
,
𝑉𝑖
#𝑗
𝑐𝑖
]} | , 
again favouring ‘high impact’ criteria. The normalised weight range is used as a tie-breaker; i.e. 
𝑔𝐵(𝑗) = 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑤𝑗 . 
Again, the lexicographic rule  
argmax
𝑗∈𝐽
𝑔𝐴(𝑗) ≫ argmax
𝑗∈𝐽
𝑔𝐵(𝑗) 
is used to choose the next criterion to be discussed by the group. 
7 Computer simulation 
7.1 Test dataset 
Several authors (e.g. Keisler 2004, Mustajoki et al. 2005, Salo & Hämäläinen 2001, Vetschera et al. 
2014) have previously deployed extensive computer simulation as a means to test ideas on preference 
programming and value of information. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed measures for 
the Value of Agreement, a large test dataset with 360 instances was generated (see Table 2 and Sup-
plementary Material A). The dataset comprises 20 instances for each possible combination of number 
of options, score distribution, weight distribution and cost distribution as provided in Table 2.  
The group members’ individual appraisals 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 are constructed as follows: 
 Two participants 𝑘1 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑘2 ∈ 𝐾 are always randomly chosen and are assigned the upper and 
lower criterion score bound; i.e. 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘1 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 and 𝑣 𝑖𝑗𝑘2 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗. 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 is normally distributed with 𝒩 (
𝑣𝑖𝑗+?̅?𝑖𝑗
2
, (
𝑣𝑖𝑗+?̅?𝑖𝑗
8
)
2
) for 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾\{𝑘1, 𝑘2} and rounded to the nearest 
integer. If 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∉ [𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗], new numbers are generated for it until 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∈ [𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗]. 
The group members’ actual agreements 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  are modelled by two different distributions A1 and A2. The 
more predictable median-focused distribution A1 is triangular with 𝑇(𝑣𝑖𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ , ?̅?𝑖𝑗). If the originally predict-
ed agreement 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  is smaller than 𝑣𝑖𝑗 or larger than ?̅?𝑖𝑗 due to bound tightening, it takes the value of the 
bound 𝑣𝑖𝑗 or ?̅?𝑖𝑗, respectively. The less predictable distribution A2 is uniform with 𝑈(𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗). For each 
combination of properties from Table 2, 10 instances receive actual agreement scores according to A1 
and the other 10 according to A2. Starting with 𝑣11, the actual agreement scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  are computed one 
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after the other. After every assignment of a new actual agreement score 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎 , the feasible ranges 
[𝑣𝑖′𝑗?̅?𝑖′𝑗] for all still non-précised scores are tightened as described in section 2. After full actual agree-
ment 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 about a further option 𝑖 is constructed, the ranges [𝑉𝑖′ , ?̅?𝑖′] of all still non-précised options are 
tightened as described in section 2. If 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 is outside the tightened score ranges for option 𝑖, the whole 
procedure is restarted from 𝑣11
𝑎 . The actual weight agreement 𝑤𝑗
𝑎 is modelled analogously. 
7.2 Comparison measures 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed measure for the Value of Agreement, we compare it with 
the simple rules of MaxRange and Random. The MaxRange rule (cf. Hämäläinen & Pöyhönen 1996, 
Salo & Hämäläinen 1995) enquires the precise actual agreement of the option (criterion) with the great-
est current score range [𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖] (weight range [𝑤𝑗 , 𝑤𝑗]) until the robust option or portfolio is elicited. The 
Random rule retrieves the precise actual agreement for a randomly chosen option (criterion) for which 
𝑉𝑖
𝑎 (𝑤𝑗
𝑎) has not yet been revealed. Preference programming6 is applied for both rules after every single 
actual agreement to exclude options that do not require further preference elicitation. 
By enumerating all feasible elicitation orders, it is possible to compute a lower bound for the number of 
required elicitations for each test instance. This lower bound could always be reached if one knew the 
participants’ actual agreements in advance. As the number of criteria is small in the test dataset (|𝐽| =
5), a full enumeration can be performed for all instances with incomplete weight information. Designing 
a branch-and-bound enumeration algorithm to compute the lower bound efficiently for all instances with 
incomplete score information might be possible, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
7.3 Results 
The test algorithm always selects the option or criterion with the greatest Value of Agreement, reveals 
its modelled actual group agreement, and applies preference programming6 on the new situation. The 
median is used as predicted agreement for scores and weights. Tables 3 to 6 show the results for the 
test dataset. 
In the MCDA case, the Value of Agreement rule on average reduces the number of option (criterion) 
elicitations statistically significantly by 50% (8%) and 45% (19%) compared to the MaxRange and the 
Random rules, respectively. For incomplete score information, MaxRange consistently ignores options 
with small ranges on the right-hand side of the value score chart despite the fact that these are more 
likely to be the robust option. Therefore, the Random rule outperforms the MaxRange rule. In the PDA 
case, the Value of Agreement rule on average decreases the number of inspected options (criteria) sta-
tistically significantly by 41% (2%) and 47% (12%) relative to the MaxRange and the Random rules, 
respectively. 
Table 2 
Properties of test dataset. 
    
 |𝐾| 8  
    
    
 
|𝐼| 25, 50 and 100 
 
    
    
 
 
𝑤𝑗 
W0: 5 criteria with random weights ?̈?𝑗 so that ∑ ?̈?𝑗𝑗 = 1 and 𝑤𝑗 = ?̈?𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗  ∀𝑗 (complete weight information) 
W1: 5 criteria with random weights ?̈?𝑗 so that ∑ ?̈?𝑗𝑗 = 1. 𝑤𝑖 and ?̅?𝑗 take with equal probability one of the following five 
value pairs: 𝑤𝑗 + 0.02 = ?̈?𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗 − 0.03; 𝑤𝑗 + 0.05 = ?̈?𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗 − 0.05; 𝑤𝑗 + 0.07 = ?̈?𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗 − 0.08; 𝑤𝑗 + 0.1 = ?̈?𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗 − 0.1; 
and 𝑤𝑗 + 0.12 = ?̈?𝑗  = ?̅?𝑗 − 0.13. 
 
    
    
 
  
𝑣𝑖𝑗 
V0: 𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,100) and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗          ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (complete score information) 
V1: 𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,95)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 5 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗    in 25% of the cases 
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,90)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 10 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases  
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,85)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 15 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,80)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 20 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
V2: 𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,90)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 10 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,80)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 20 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,70)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 30 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
       𝑣𝑖𝑗~𝑈(0,60)   and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 40 = ?̅?𝑖𝑗  in 25% of the cases 
 
    
    
 
 
 
𝑐𝑖 
Let 𝑟𝑖 =
1
𝑐𝑖
′ ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑣𝑖𝑗+?̅?𝑖𝑗 
2𝑗
 be the average value-for-money ratio of option 𝑖 and 𝑈( ) a uniform distribution, then 
C1: 𝑟𝑖~𝑈(1,2.5) ∀𝑖  
C2: 𝑟𝑖~𝑈(1,10) ∀𝑖. 
The resulting 𝑐𝑖
′ from settings C1 and C2 are normalised to 𝑐𝑖 so that ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 2,500. 𝐵 = 1,000 is assumed as the budget for 
all problem instances. 
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The results underscore that a more accurate prediction of the agreed value score improves the effec-
tiveness of the Value of Agreement rule. For A2 instances, the Value of Agreement rule decreases the 
number of required option agreements by 41% in the MCDA and by 43% in the PDA case, compared to 
the Random rule; but for A1 instances, these numbers rise to 49% in the MCDA and 51% in the PDA 
case. Overall, the Value of Agreement measure seems to make the greatest gains by looking for op-
tions that trigger ordinal-based weak dominance rules, have a large score range and are not too far 
away from the true borderline 𝜑. The gains from a more precise prediction of the agreement (i.e. chang-
ing from A1 to A2 instances) were much smaller. This is because prediction errors are limited by the 
scores’ upper and lower bounds, what means that the predicted borderline ?̂? should even for less accu-
rate predictions of the agreed scores not be located too far from the unknown true borderline 𝜑 in most 
cases.  
Increasing the score ranges from setting V1 to V2 leads to 66% and 33% more required option agree-
ments for the MCDA and PDA case, respectively, when using the Value of Agreement rule. This is an 
expected result because the more the participants disagree on the scoring, the longer it should take to 
reach group agreement on the robust option. Decreasing the spread of the options’ value-for-money 
ratios from setting C2 to C1 doubles the average number of required option agreements in the PDA 
case when using the Value of Agreement rule. This result is also less surprising because if all options 
tend to be, on average, more or less equally attractive in terms of their value-for-money ratios, it be-
comes less likely that many options 𝑖 are dominated or dominating, independent of what actual scores 
𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  the group finally agrees on. 
Unlike for incomplete score information, the reduction in required preference elicitations is small for in-
complete weight information—both in percentage and nominal terms. This can be explained by the fact 
that the MaxRange rule already provides solutions near the lower bound. The required number of elici-
tations when using the MaxRange rule is just 29% and 8% higher for the MCDA and the PDA case, re-
Table 3 
Average number of required option agreements 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 in the MCDA case with Value of Agreement rule (first number), MaxRange rule (sec-
ond number) and Random rule (third number) for the 240 W0 test instances grouped by number of options, value score distribution and 
agreement model. 
     
  V1  V2 
  A1 A2  A1 A2 
25    1.3  |   2.3  |   2.1   1.9  |   3.1  |   2.7    2.4  |    4.6  |    4.7    2.9  |    5.3  |    4.8 
50    1.6  |   3.2  |   2.7   1.6  |   3.1  |   2.4    2.9  |  06.3  |    5.8    3.1  |  07.3  |    6.8 
100    2.0  |   4.3  |   3.9   2.1  |   3.5  |   3.2    2.1  |  07.3  |  06.4    3.3  |  07.7  |    6.3 
       
 
Table 4 
Average number of required option agreements 𝑉𝑖
𝑎 in the PDA case with Value of Agreement rule (first number), MaxRange rule (sec-
ond number) and Random rule (third number) for the 240 W0 test instances grouped by number of options, value score distribution, cost 
distribution and agreement model. 
     
  V1  V2 
  A1   A2  A1 A2 
25 C1 08.3  |  12.2  |  12.1 08.3  |  10.9  |  11.5    9.3  |  14.2  |  15.5 11.1  |  13.4  |  15.4 
25 C2 04.0  |  04.8  |  05.0 02.2  |  02.8  |  03.3  06.5  |  09.3  |  19.8   4.9  |    7.2  |    7.5 
50 C1 12.7  |  24.8  |  28.0 16.4  |  27.1  |  29.4  15.0  |  27.1  |  29.9 20.5  |  31.9  |  34.8 
50 C2 05.0  |  07.4  |  08.5 08.6  |  12.0  |  13.3    7.9  |  17.4  |  17.2 10.3  |  16.5  |  19.3 
100 C1 17.8  |  49.9  |  57.2 26.7  |  55.5  |  64.0  24.0  |  50.3  |  55.5 31.7  |  53.3  |  61.9 
100 C2 09.8  |  26.7  |  32.3 11.1  |  24.2  |  26.7  10.7  |  31.5  |  35.6 21.3  |  37.8  |  46.7 
       
 
Table 5 
Average number of required criterion agreements 
𝑤𝑗
𝑎 in the MCDA case for the lower bound (first num-
ber), with the Value of Agreement rule (second num-
ber), with the MaxRange rule (third number) and with 
the Random rule (fourth number) for the 120 V0-W1 
test instances grouped by number of options and 
agreement model. 
 
  
 A1 A2 
25 01.9 | 02.2 | 02.2 | 02.9 01.9 | 02.2 | 02.5 | 02.9 
50 01.3 | 01.8 | 01.8 | 01.9 01.6 | 01.9 | 02.3 | 02.3 
100 01.5 | 01.7 | 01.8 | 02.5 02.0 | 02.4 | 02.6 | 02.4 
   
 
 Table 6 
Average number of required criterion agreements 𝑤𝑗
𝑎 in the PDA case for 
the lower bound (first number), with the Value of Agreement rule (second 
number), with the MaxRange rule (third number) and with the Random rule 
(fourth number) for the 120 V0-W1 test instances grouped by number of 
options, cost distribution and agreement model.  
   
  A1  A2 
25 C1 03.3 | 03.4 | 03.4 | 04.3 03.6 | y3.8 | 03.9 | 04.0 
25 C2 02.3 | 02.7 | 02.6 | 03.3 02.6 | 03.1 | 03.1 | 03.2 
50 C1 03.9 | 04.2 | 04.5 | 04.6 04.0 | 04.1 | 04.2 | 04.9 
50 C2 02.6 | 03.1 | 03.2 | 04.0 03.1 | 03.5 | 03.6 | 04.0 
100 C1 04.4 | 04.5 | 04.5 | 05.0 04.6 | 04.6 | 04.7 | 04.8 
100 C2 04.3 | 04.3 | 04.4 | 04.8 03.9 | y3.9 | 04.1 | 04.7 
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spectively, as compared to the lower bound. The Value of Agreement rule reduces this deviation from 
the lower bound to 19% and 6%, respectively. 
8 Application to recruitment 
Ennovators Ltd. is a medium size e-commerce brand developer with approximately 100 employees in 
its London office. In summer 2015, the company’s marketing department advertised to recruit a pricing 
analyst. The recruitment exercise was conducted by a panel consisting of the head of e-commerce, a 
marketing manager and a pricing analyst. A decision analysis model informed the recruitment process.  
Several real-world applications of decision analysis to the recruitment process have been previously 
reported in the literature. Most publications showcase a fuzzy approach (e.g. Afshari et al. 2013, 
Petrovic‐Lazarevic 2001, Polychroniou & Giannikos 2009); often combined with other techniques such 
as AHP (Celik et al. 2009, Khosla et al. 2009), ANP (Kabak et al. 2012) and TOPSIS (Kelemenis & 
Askounis 2010, Wang et al. 2006). Using fuzzy sets, the authors seek to consider the uncertainties as-
sociated with appraising candidates. Stal-Le Cardinal et al. (2011) applied Electre Tri to select a portfo-
lio of students for university admission. Gibney & Shang (2007) used AHP for recruiting the dean of a 
business school. Finally, Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright (2000) provided detailed insights into developing 
a simple MDCA model for faculty recruitment in view of anti-discrimination laws. In line with Barclay 
(2001), we could not find evidence in the literature showing that decision analysis is used much in 
practice to inform the recruitment process. Among other reasons (Jessop 2004), we argue that the 
complexity of the elicitation process in many previous case studies severely hinders the uptake by prac-
titioners (cf. Belton & Stewart 2002, Keeney & von Winterfeldt 2007). Therefore, it was our aim to de-
sign a user-friendly, time-efficient and rigorous decision analysis approach for the Ennovators’ recruit-
ment process. 
As the initial step of the Ennovators’ recruitment process, the panel jointly constructed the decision 
model by agreeing on criteria, value scales and weights. Based on the job description and the compa-
ny’s core behavioural values, ‘analytics software’, ‘numerical skills’, ‘personality fit’, ‘pricing experience’ 
and ‘self-motivation’ were chosen as the assessment criteria. For each criterion, a candidate’s minimum 
required performance level in order to be considered for the job was assigned a value score of 0 points 
and 100 points for the maximum desired performance level. Verbal descriptions of the performance 
levels were assigned to the value score points of 25, 50 and 75 for each criterion using the bi-section 
method (Fishburn 1967). The resulting value scales are shown in Table 8. Note that the verbal descrip-
tions of the five equal-distanced points on the value scales only serve as a reference, and panel mem-
bers were free to assess candidates with any other value score between 0 and 100 for a particular crite-
rion. All five criteria are intangible in the sense that a candidate’s precise value score for a criterion de-
pends on the assessors’ subjective interpretations of CV, cover letter and interview performance based 
on the assessors’ knowledge and experience. Due to the diversity of job candidates, it is not practical to 
construct more precise value scales (Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright 2000). Criteria trade-offs were as-
sessed using the SWING weighting method (Edwards & Barron 1994, von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986) 
which compares the value of improvement from 0 to 100 for each criterion. The recruitment process 
takes the form of a portfolio decision analysis problem with a predetermined number of candidates be-
ing invited to the next interview round (the budget) and each interview causing fixed costs of 1. 
An easy-to-use software was developed to support preference programming under incomplete score 
information for portfolio decision analysis (freely available from Supplementary Material B). Fig. 5 
shows a screenshot of the software’s window for the value-for-money chart from the case study. Candi-
dates who will not and will definitely be invited for an interview are displayed on the bottom left and 
right, respectively. The Value of Agreement concept suggests discussing Marco next, whose value 
score bar7 is highlighted. Double-clicking on the name opens a new window in which the decision mak-
ers can see the score ranges [𝑣𝑖𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗] and they can type in their jointly-agreed scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎   for Marco.  The 
software tool allows the choice between the social judgement scheme (used in this case study) and the 
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VOGA’s candidate review consisted of four steps. In step 1, HR screened the 87 incoming applications 
and excluded 47 (e.g. no proper cover letter, requiring work permit, no university degree, obvious  
Table 7 
Assessment criteria with weights in parenthesis and value scale.  
 
   
Analytics software (21%) 
100_ Advanced skills in Excel (e.g. pivot tables, conditional format-
ting) AND considerable experience in VBA AND experience in 
Google Analytics AND considerable experience in at least 
one other relevant analytics tool (e.g. data mining software, 
R, SQL, computer programming) 
75_ Advanced skills in Excel AND experience in VBA AND expe-
rience in at least one other relevant analytics tools 
50_ Advanced skills in Excel AND some experience in VBA  
25_ Advanced skills in Excel 
0_ Basic skills in Excel (e.g. chart building, cell functions) 
Numerical skills (24%) 
100_ Degree in a highly numerical subject (e.g. math, science, 
finance, economics) AND at least one year’s work experience 
in an analyst role 
75_ Degree in a highly numerical subject OR at least one year’s 
work experience in an analyst role 
50_ Degree in business administration, marketing or a related 
field OR some experience in applying numerical skills in a 
work environment 
25_ Degree which includes some numerical modules (e.g. psy-
chology) 
0_ Non-numerical university degree 
Personality fit8 (15%): Creative, good command over English, 
experience working at a SME, open-minded, outgoing, pro-active, 
sense of humour 
100_ Candidate is expected to fit perfectly into the culture of Enno-
vators AND most of the staff are very much expected to like 
to work with the candidate (evidence to look for: previous 
work experience of dealing with people, examples of behav-
iour provided in cover letter and interview, and verbal and 
non-verbal communication in the interview) 
75_ Candidate is expected to fit well into the culture of Ennovators 
with some minor limitations (e.g. minor language barriers, no 
evidence of dealing successful with conflicts, a bit shy) 
 
50_ Candidate is not expected to contribute positively or negative-
ly to Ennovators’ working environment AND candidate is 
unlikely to cause any communication or behavioural problems 
25_ Other employees are expected to be able to work together 
with the candidate without any major issues AND candidate 
has room for improving communication and social interac-
tions (e.g. very shy, less efficient communication) 
0_ Staff at Ennovators could work with the candidate (e.g. rather 
poor English, rather unskilled communicator, slightly arro-
gant) 
 
Pricing experience (29%) 
100_ Experienced in developing pricing models or strategies 
75_ Familiar with pricing through work experience 
50_ Good understanding of pricing theory from university 
25_ Some basic understanding of pricing (e.g. through marketing 
modules at university) 
0_ No previous knowledge 
 
Self-motivated and willingness to learn (12%): Career progres-
sion, extracurricular activities, good grades, interest in job 
100_ Top grades at university (e.g. distinction) AND strong career 
progression (if applicable) AND further training (e.g. master’s, 
diplomas, languages, internships, volunteering) AND strong 
examples of work ethos in the cover letter or interview AND 
shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
75_ Good grades (e.g. merit) AND (strong career progression OR 
further training) AND very good examples of work ethos AND 
shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
50_ (Acceptable career progression OR some further training) 
AND good examples of work ethos AND shows a satisfactory 
level of interest in job vacancy 
25_ Poor grades (e.g. pass) AND good examples of work ethos 
AND shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy  
0_ Shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
 
   
 
 
Fig. 5. Screenshot of value-for-money chart from the first group discussion. Candidate names have been changed. 
 
 
 
12 
 
median to predict the agreed value score. To avoid biasing the decision makers, the software’s value-
for-money chart does not reveal the predicted scores 𝑉𝑖
∗ to the participants. 
Ennovators’ candidate review consisted of four steps. In step one, HR screened the 87 incoming appli-
cations and excluded 47 (e.g. no proper cover letter, requiring work permit, no university degree, obvi-
ous misfits). In step two, each panel member scored the remaining 40 applications individually using 
the agreed value scales in Table 7. In a subsequent one-hour group discussion, the panel members 
sought the necessary agreement on the scores to select the 10 candidates who should be invited to an 
interview (individual and agreed value scores are available in Supplementary Material C). The discus-
sion was facilitated by a decision analyst who also entered the agreed scores into the software tool. At 
no point during the discussion did the panel members have a particular preference on which candi-
date’s score agreement should be sought next, and therefore they always followed the suggestion 
made by the software tool. In step three, nine interviews were held soon afterwards (one candidate sent 
their apologies) and each panel member individually updated their previous scorings. In the subsequent 
group discussion, the panel members used the software tool to agree on the three candidates to be in-
vited to the final round on the following day; this discussion was however conducted without the support 
from a decision analyst. In step four, a problem-solving interview was held and the panel members up-
dated their previous individual scorings of the candidates before discussing them as a group. The soft-
ware tool was not employed in step four because the panel required a full ranking of the three candi-
dates in case the best one rejected the job offer. Overall, the panel members were confident that they 
made the job offer to the best candidate, which meant that the decision model was requisite (Phillips 
1984).  
The case study revealed two technical problems that were not relevant in the computer simulation. The 
first problem involves candidates on whom the panel members disagree with regards to their individual 
scorings; i.e. whether or not a particular candidate meets the minimum required performance level for a 
particular criterion. If a panel member 𝑘 believes that a candidate 𝑖 does not meet the minimum ex-
pected performance levels in criterion 𝑗, they would choose a prohibitive high value score of 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 =
−300 such that candidate 𝑖 can practically never become a ‘dominating option’ unless all the panel 
members jointly agree on a better score for 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  following a group discussion. The second problem en-
tails situations where the group agrees on a value score 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  for option 𝑖 in criterion 𝑗 which is outside its 
range [𝑣𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖𝑗]. This situation occurred once in the case study when none of the panel members real-
ised before the group discussion that one candidate’s personality fit was actually very poor. Some pre-
viously determined dominance relations may become invalid if the agreed value score of 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  lies outside 
the range [𝑣𝑖𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗]—thus, options previously identified as dominated or dominating need to be reconsid-
ered. In cases where an option 𝑖’s agreed value score on a particular criterion 𝑗 lies outside its original 
value score range, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 takes the value 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  for all participants 𝑘 and the preference programme is re-
initialised, beginning with the complete original set of options. 
Reflecting on the recruitment process, the panel members highlighted that the use of decision analysis 
forced them to properly assess candidates against all job requirements and to try to avoid becoming 
biased by individual aspects (see also Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright 2000, Gibney & Shang 2007). Alt-
hough considerably more time-consuming, the panel members agreed that using proper multi-criteria 
decision models should lead to better and more transparent recruitment decisions. Since scoring mod-
els (in various forms and shapes) are commonly used in a business environment, the panel members 
readily grasped and accepted the core elements of the developed decision model (additive value func-
tion, bisection method, and SWING weighting). 
The panel members also believed that the often-employed aggregation method to reach consensus in 
multi-criteria group decision making would have been inappropriate in this case study. As mentioned in 
the introduction section of this paper, the aggregation method computes a proposed aggregate 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 
based on group members’ individual scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘 and automatically decides on the group’s preferred 
portfolio using the scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑝
. But several times, only one panel member 𝑘′ made a particular observa-
tion about a candidate (e.g. noticing an important but hidden detail in the CV or knowing a particular 
analytics software that the candidate mentioned) which led to a rather extreme criterion score 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘′; 
however, this turned out to be justified in the subsequent group discussion in the sense that the actually 
agreed score 𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑎  was close to 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘′ and far from the predicted score 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ . Thus, calculating the preferred 
candidate portfolio based on automatically calculated aggregates could have led to a poor recruitment 
decision in this case study. On the other hand, it would not have been practically feasible to discuss all 
40 applications one-by-one due to time constraints. Therefore, preference programming offered a way 
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to retain valuable individual scores by not settling for automatic aggregates but also keeping the deci-
sion problem at a practically manageable size. In this context, the Value of Agreement can be seen as 
a useful tool to make preference programming more effective but also more user-friendly in situations 
where a skilled facilitator is not present. 
9 Conclusion 
Deciding on which option a group should discuss next in a decision analysis workshop following indi-
vidual option appraisals has always involved only informed guess-work. This paper introduced the Val-
ue of Agreement concept to measure for which options it is particularly worth seeking further group 
agreement in order to make a robust group decision quickly. An extensive computer simulation and a 
case study demonstrated the usefulness of the proposed Value of Agreement concept. In addition, we 
provided a free software programme to allow practitioners and researchers to readily employ prefer-
ence programming and the Value of Agreement for standard portfolio decision analysis. 
The Value of Agreement concept is primarily developed for decision problems where the number of op-
tions is large, but the available time to seek group agreement is rather limited. Practical examples in-
clude recurring decision problems such as hiring processes, maintenance prioritisations, project ten-
ders, credit approvals and research funding decisions. As most decision problems are assessed with 
only a few criteria, we are less convinced of the practical relevance of applying the Value of Agreement 
to weights. Furthermore, by comparing the results for three different prioritisation rules (Value of 
Agreement, MaxRange and Random) with the theoretical lower bound, the possibilities for reducing the 
number of required elicitations were shown to be limited for incomplete weight information.  
We broadly defined the Value of Agreement as an estimate for the impact of eliciting additional prefer-
ence information on the time requirements of a decision analysis workshop. The present paper applies 
the new concept only to a specific workshop design and problem formulation. Therefore, there is scope 
for more research. First, the present paper assumes that the group always seeks maximal agreement 
on an option’s value score 𝑉𝑖 before discussing the next option. Future work may advocate a more flex-
ible approach of switching between discussing the individual criterion value scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗 from different 
options. In this case, the Value of Agreement concept could be used to provide guidance on which cri-
terion value scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗 seeking further agreement is particularly worthwhile and when it might be advis-
able to move on to the next option without having reached full agreement on the option’s value score 𝑉𝑖. 
Thereby facilitators need to be mindful of the additional cognitive burden to participants that might be 
imposed by the frequent switching of the discussed option. Second, the present paper assumes that a 
group is prepared to discard an option only if it is strictly dominated. However, in some cases, the max-
imum loss of value in discarding a particular option may be so small that it would not be worth the deci-
sion making group’s time (Salo & Hämäläinen 2010). Thus, future applications of the Value of Agree-
ment concept might explicitly consider the costs of decision makers’ time when proposing the next op-
tion for group discussion. Ultimately, the Value of Agreement concept might be used to seek group 
consensus on preference assessments until the maximum loss of value of the decision problem has 
been reduced to a level that the group feels comfortable with. The final decision could be made later by 
using the aggregation method mentioned in the introduction section, by applying decision rules for in-
complete preferences such as minimax regret or by delegating the final decision to particular individuals 
for further considerations. Third, the present paper assumes that decision makers express their prefer-
ences numerically. Alternatively, the Value of Agreement concept can also be applied to qualitative 
preference judgements (e.g. Fasolo & Bana e Costa 2014). Those qualitative judgements can be in the 
form of preference classes (e.g. ‘very good’), ordinal preference relations (e.g. ‘X belongs to the 5 best 
options’) or intensity preferences (e.g. ‘weakly preferred’). A behind-the-scenes model translates the 
qualitative judgements into incomplete preference information (e.g. Bana e Costa & Vansnick 1994, 
Punkka & Salo 2013) and solves the resulting preference programme. Again, the question is where the 
decision maker should begin to make their qualitative judgements more precise. Fourth, the present 
paper applies the Value of Agreement concept only to SWING weighting. If future research can demon-
strate that the Value of Agreement is indeed practically useful for weights, the adaption of this concept 
to other weight-elicitation methods would be an obvious research opportunity. Fifth, the present paper 
only addresses a basic PDA formulation. Applications of the Value of Agreement concept to more gen-
eral PDA cases would be welcomed. 
Future work may also develop measures for the Value of Agreement in a more systematic way than in 
this paper. Better heuristic choices for the predicted score of the robust option in the MCDA case and 
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better usage of the knapsack problem characteristic in the PDA case would be desirable. It is also pos-
sible to examine whether there are benefits from recommending the next option for group discussion 
based on more complex option agreement scenarios. For instance, a decision tree could be used to 
model how the choice for the next option is influenced by which options the group might select after-
wards and what happens if the group agreement deviates from the prediction. Finally, a more axiomatic 
approach to the constructions of measures for the Value of Agreement, with proven properties of the 
solution quality, would be of theoretical interest. 
As a final point, it should not be concluded from this paper that the group must always mechanically 
attempt to find full agreement on the option with the greatest Value of Agreement. Sometimes there are 
options for which agreement can be found very easily or those on which the participants have funda-
mentally different perspectives (Mustajoki & Hämäläinen 2005). Dias (2007) argues that the participants 
should first focus on the less difficult elicitation questions to allow them to learn more about the used 
method and their preferences before tackling the difficult ones. One may also want to consider that 
gaining almost no progress in finding agreement from the start can endanger the ‘emotional life’ 
(Phillips & Phillips 1993) of the group and thus, the success of the workshop. Therefore a skilled facilita-
tor should balance the recommendations prescribed by the Value of Agreement and the need to tackle 
easy tasks first. 
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Endnotes 
1_Following their argument, options with a core index of around 0.5 should probably be examined first. 
2 As an alternative to Hazen’s strict dominance rule, one may apply a quasi-dominance rule instead (Dias & Climaco 2005). In this case, 
an option 𝑖∗ is defined as robust if no other option 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼\{𝑖∗} with an upper bound ?̅?𝑖 exceeding the lower bound 𝑉𝑖∗ of option 𝑖
∗ by more 
than a given tolerance value 𝜀 exists. Quasi-dominance allows taking into account that the maximum loss of value the group could suf-
fer when choosing option 𝑖∗ may be too small to justify letting the decision making group convene for longer (Salo & Hämäläinen 
2010). Quasi-dominance would add more complexity to the decision model and therefore is not discussed further in this paper. 
3_When the heuristic choice ?̂? takes the value of an already agreed overall value score of an option 𝑠 (i.e. ?̂? = 𝑉𝑠
𝑎), the upper bounds of 
some other options 𝑡 might be tightened such that ?̅?𝑡 = 𝑉𝑠
𝑎 = ?̂?. Those options 𝑡 are highly unlikely to be identified as robust after fur-
ther preference elicitation. Therefore, the open interval (𝑉𝑖′
#𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖′
#𝑖) is used for 𝑔𝐴(𝑖) in the MCDA case so that options 𝑡 are counted as 
practically dominated. 
4_The table below provides a numerical illustration for the example depicted in Fig. 2. Three participants assess four options on two 
criteria and the median is used to predict the group’s agreement. The borderline takes the value ?̂? = max
𝑖
{𝑉𝑖
∗} = 66. Furthermore, as 
an additional notation, let ?̅?𝑖′𝑗
#𝑖  be the upper bound of 𝑣𝑖′𝑗 when assuming that 𝑣𝑖𝑗 takes the predicted value 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗ .  
   
 Criterion 1 (𝑤1 = 0.5)  Criterion 2 (𝑤2 = 0.5)     
 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3  Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3  𝑉𝑖 ?̅?𝑖 𝑉𝑖
∗ 
Option 1 6 94 68  64 100 50  28 97 66 
Option 2 0 10 90  0 36 62  0 76 23 
Option 3 43 12 64  50 4 47  8 57 45 
Option 4 38 78 84  36 38 64  37 74 58 
 
It is shown in the following that the measure 𝑔𝐴 for the Value Agreement of option 4 takes the value of 1. Option 4 dominates option 2 
on criterion 2 because all three participants 𝑘 assigned a higher score to 𝑣42𝑘 than to 𝑣22𝑘. Using the median, the predicted score for 
option 4 on criterion 2 is 𝑣42
∗ = 38, which becomes the upper bound for option 2 on criterion 2; i.e. 𝑣22
#4
= 38. 𝑣21
#4
= 𝑣21 = 90 because 
option 4 does not dominate option 2 on criterion 1. It follows that the upper bound for option 2, when assuming the predicted agree-
ment for option 4, is ?̅?2
#4 = 𝑤1𝑣21
#4
+ 𝑤2𝑣22
#4
= 64, which is smaller than the borderline ?̂?. The upper bound of option 3 ?̅?3 is already 
smaller than ?̂?, and ?̅?4
#4 = 𝑉4
∗ = 58 as well. There are no dominance relationships between option 1 and 4, which means ?̅?1
#4 = ?̅?1 =
97. It follows that only option 1 intersects the borderline when assuming that the group agrees on the predicted scores 𝑣𝑖𝑗
∗  for option 4, 
meaning that 𝑔𝐴(4) = 1. 
5_When testing Liesiö et al.’s PDA preference programme (2007) for incomplete weight information, we noticed that their algorithm does 
not identify all dominated portfolios and therewith all dominated options. For instance, it is possible that a portfolio 𝑝1 is dominated by 
portfolio 𝑝2 or 𝑝3 for all feasible weight combinations, but there is always a feasible weight combination such that 𝑝1 is not dominated 
by 𝑝2 and a feasible weight combination such that 𝑝1 is not dominated by 𝑝3. As Liesiö et al.’s algorithm only uses pairwise compari-
sons of portfolios, it does not recognise that 𝑝1 is actually dominated. To test whether a portfolio 𝑝1 is dominated by any other set of 
portfolios for all feasible weight combinations, one can solve a linear programme with arbitrary objective function where (i) the weights 
are constrained by their upper and lower bounds and (ii) there is a linear constraint for each other’s portfolio such that 𝑝1 is not domi-
nated by this portfolio. If the linear programme has no feasible solution for the weights, there is no feasible weight allocation so that 𝑝1 
is not dominated—hence 𝑝1 is dominated. 
6_For the PDA case, the preference programme from Liesiö et al. (2007) is given a time limit of 2 seconds. The algorithm is written in 
VB.NET x64 release and ran on a 2.8 GHz processor with 4GB RAM. 
7_As 𝑐𝑖 = 1 for all candidates 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, the value-for-money ratio bars depicted in Fig. 5 are identical with the candidates’ value score bars 
[𝑉𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖].  
8_Given the limited information about a candidate’s personality fit before the interview, the panel members agreed to be generous when 
appraising only the candidates’ written applications and scored most participants between 70 and 90 on this criterion in step 2 of the 
recruitment process. 
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